Political Polarization in Taiwan and the United States: A Research Puzzle by Clark C et al.




Cal Clark, Auburn University 
 
Alexander C. Tan, National Chengchi University & University of Canterbury 
 































Prepared for presentation at the Taiwan Institute for Governance and Communication Research (TIGCR) 
International Conference on “Political Polarization: Perspectives of Governance and Communications, 







During the first two decades of the 21st century, the major political parties in both Taiwan (the 
Democratic Progressive Party or DPP and the Kuomintang or KMT) and the United States (Democrats 
and Republicans) became increasingly polarized in bitter political conflict.  In Taiwan, this polarization 
centered on the strongly inter-linked issues of national identity and cross-Strait relations (Clark and Tan, 
2012; Copper, 2016; Fell, 2005, 2018;  Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; Rigger, 2011; Wachman, 1994), while 
in the U.S. the two major parties became polarized on a wide array of economic, cultural, and security 
issues (Abramowitz, 2010, 2011; Black and Black, 2007; Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Brownstein, 2007; 
Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, 2003).  In both 
countries, however, the sharp and vicious polarization of the political elites did not seemingly reflect a 
similar polarization in the electorate.  This situation seemingly challenges the prominent Downsian theory 
that party positions should reflect the distribution of public opinion based on the assumption that the 
parties will seek to maximize their vote totals (Downs, 1957).   
This paper explores this seeming paradox.  The first section sketches the basic theoretical model; 
the second provides an overview of the growing polarization in American and Taiwanese politics; and the 
third presents survey data from these two countries that cast considerable doubt on whether citizen public 
opinion is the driving force behind political polarization.  The conclusion then seeks to adduce an 
explanation for why rational politicians would pursue policies that appear to be irrational for their 
presumed goals of maximizing electoral support and winning office and argues that the observed trends 
suggest that the “catch-all parties” that evolved during the post World War II era may be now 
deteriorating under new political conditions. 
   
Growing Polarization: A Theoretical Puzzle 
 
The widely, if not universally, perceived growing partisan polarization in American and 
Taiwanese politics represents something of a theoretical puzzle because it would be unexpected for two, 
interrelated reasons.  First, the evolution of party systems in the developed world, at least until quite 
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recently, seemingly made such polarization less, not more, likely.  Second, polarization is generally 
expected to be muted in two-party systems, such as those that exist in the U.S. and essentially in Taiwan. 
There are two primary approaches to conceptualizing the nature of party systems.  One focuses on 
the number and identity of major parties (Downs, 1957; Duverger, 1959; Sartori, 1976).  From this 
perspective, once mass suffrage was achieved in the advanced industrialized nations by the 1920s, their 
party systems became remarkably stable (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997).  A second interpretative 
focus, however, suggests fundamental changes in the nature of political parties over the last 150 years 
(Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997).  These changes, in particular, should have reduced the likelihood of 
extreme polarization. 
Richard Katz and Peter Mair have developed a model of the evolution of four fundamentally 
different types of parties (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997).  For much of the 19th century when suffrage 
was quite restrictive, politics was dominated by elite parties of office-holders and notables.  Expanding 
suffrage during the late 19th and early 20th centuries created the base for mass parties which represented 
distinct social groups and dominated democratic politics through the end of World War II.  Because of 
their close ties with specific groups and classes, mass parties focused their electoral efforts on mobilizing 
the members of the groups that they represented, rather than reaching out to other groups.   
Mass parties came under increasing challenge, however, partially as a result of their very success.  
The old elite parties could not compete based on the support of just the social groups that they had 
represented because these constituencies simply were not large enough.  Thus, they had to develop 
broader appeals.  More importantly, the mass parties representing new political and social groups were 
ultimately successful in gaining power and implementing broad reforms that helped their previously 
socially marginalized and politically excluded constituencies.  This lessened the demand for and appeal of 
this type of party; and the postwar economic boom accelerated the process by creating broad middle-class 
societies in the developed world.  This, in turn, led to declining polarization in the electorate or what 
Daniel Bell (1960) termed The End of Ideology.   
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Political parties responded by transforming themselves into catch-all ones (Kirchheimer, 1966) 
that appealed to political issue position rather than social identity in general and took moderate positions 
to appeal to the bulk of the citizenry in particular.  In addition, most interest groups expected to work with 
all of the major parties, rather than regarding one as their exclusive representative.  By the 1970s, finally, 
a new type of cartel party began to emerge in a system in which major parties collaborated to share some 
governmental resources. 
This sequence of party development strongly suggests that political polarization should have 
decreased markedly over time in most developed democracies.  The rise of mass parties greatly increased 
polarization among parties committed to representing social groups and classes with clashing interests.  
However, catch-all parties emerged when the polarization within the citizenry declined; and their electoral 
strategies then reduced the political space available for those with extreme positions and views.  Finally, 
cartel parties reduced the potential for polarization even further by discovering collaborative self-interest 
among electorally competing parties. 
As noted above, not just the nature of parties but the number of major parties is important for 
defining the nature of a party system.  From this perspective, there is a widespread consensus that two-
party systems should be associated with low levels of polarization.  This is because, with only two major 
parties, their major competition is for the moderate middle of the ideological spectrum.  In the words of 
Giovanni Sartori (1976: 191), “Twopartyism ‘works’ when the spread of opinion is small and its 
distribution single peaked.”  If public opinion substantially departs from this situation, Sartori argues, 
another type of party system will almost inevitably emerge.   
This reflects one approach to explaining the number of parties by the nature of social cleavages in 
a society (Hsieh, 2009; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Sartori, 1976), even if there is no real theoretical reason 
to exclude the possibility that a society today could be divided into two polar and hostile groups, as many 
were during the era of mass parties.  There is another theory, though, that the nature of the electoral 
system has a major impact on the number of parties -- in particular, that single-member districts promote 
a two-party system, while proportional representation is conducive to a multi-party system (Downs, 1957; 
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Duverger, 1959; Hsieh, 2009; Rae, 1971).  This further suggests that a two-party system may somewhat 
ameliorate sharp social cleavages given how “sticky” political institutions generally are (March and 
Olsen, 1989; Riker, 1982). 
Sartori (1976) presented a model of the nature of political parties in what he termed “polarized 
pluralism.”  In such party systems, centrifugal social cleavages and forces driving the polity apart are 
more important than centripetal ones binding it together.  This results in the existence of an important 
anti-system party or parties, “irresponsible” opposition and overpromising, and a highly emotional 
involvement in politics by “true believers.”  Overall, he terms this an “ideological” approach to politics. 
The ideological conflict in the era of mass parties from the late 19th century through the middle of 
the 20th century was generally based on social class.  With the diminishment of class cleavages in the 
postwar era, there were predictions of “the end of ideology” (Bell, 1960) which presumably would reduce 
political polarization.  Yet, by the late 20th century, there was a rise what David Leege and his colleagues 
(2002) have termed “cultural issues” which directly reflect the identities of and allegiances to competing 
social groups: 
People who identify with different social groups often have different, deeply held perspectives 
not only on how they should live but also on the scope of the political community and its 
purposes.  They have a sense of legitimate moral order, and they expect other citizens and their 
government to further that design.  They often dislike and distrust groups with rival perspectives, 
and they even feel that some groups have no right to participate in democratic politics, much less 
to have their rivals’ perspectives become binding on society.  Parties become anchored in social 
groups, and political leaders fashion value and interest coalitions for electoral advantage (Leege, 
Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002: 5). 
 
They argue that this group basis of social and cultural issues is the key to understanding why they 
are so emotional and polarizing (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002).  Some of these issues (e.g., 
abortion) involve intense moral questions and, as a consequence, lead to polarization between camps of 
extremist supporters and opponents.  Beyond such effects, these social issues also involve how groups 
and communities define themselves and view opposing groups who threaten their most cherished and 
fundamental values: 
Cultural politics is less a set of issues than a style of argumentation that invokes fundamental 
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social values and emphasizes group differences (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002, 27-
28; emphasis in original). 
 
The escalating polarization in both American and Taiwanese politics, to sum, represents a 
seeming theoretical puzzle for two reasons.  First, the evolving nature of political parties in the Katz and 
Mair model (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997) suggests that sharp political polarization should 
essentially be a thing of the past in developed democracies with the fading of class cleavages and 
ideological politics.  Second, the two-party systems of Taiwan and the United States should be especially 
resistant to “polarized pluralism” (Sartori, 1976).  Yet, the theory of “cultural politics” (Leege, Wald, 
Krueger, and Mueller, 2002) provides an answer to this anomaly since it presumes that “cultural” and 
“identity” differences can provide sharp ideological divides that are not necessarily related to class 
cleavages.  This suggests that the best strategy to explain considerable polarization in a specific nation is 
to explicate the basis for its “cultural” divisions.  More broadly, the rise of cultural politics also implies 
that catch-all parties may be coming under increasing challenge because their electoral strategy is based 




The Bases for Growing Polarization  
In Taiwan and the United States 
      
The theoretical discussion in the previous section implies that we should look for sharp cultural 
divisions in a polity to explain the escalation of polarization in a post-industrial society.  In Taiwan, such 
a division is very easy to discern based on ethnic identification.  This is the divide between the so-called 
Mainlanders (slightly less than 15% of the population) who evacuated to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek in 
the late 1940s and the large majority of much longer term residents or Islanders (Brown, 2004; Wachman, 
1994).  The American cleavage is not so neatly tied to specific social groups.  Rather, America’s “culture 
wars” (Hunter, 1991; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, 2018) started 
6 
 
out reflecting the sharp debate between the supporters and opponents of “traditional values” on which the 
citizenry divide much differently than on the class-based “politics of rich and poor.”   
Both these “cultural divisions,” in addition, have changed significantly over the last decade.  
Taiwanese nationalism became increasingly associated with the Minnan majority of about 70% of the 
population who came to Taiwan from China’s Fujian Province (Lee, 2005) -- in addition to Mainlanders, 
Taiwan’s population is composed of 15% Hakka and 2% aborigines.  For the United States, the political 
upheaval set off by the Great Recession has led to the emergence of the role of government as a “culture 
war” issue (Brooks, 2010).  More broadly, at least among the political elites, support for different types of 
issues has become much more unified among both conservatives and liberals (Layman, Carsey, Green, 
Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010).  In somewhat different ways, both of these developments suggest that 
growing polarization has the potential to become institutionalized.  Polarization in Taiwan is seemingly 
rooted in long-term ethnic identities (Lee, 2005; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005); and the United States 
appears to be experiencing “conflict extension” to a growing number of emotional issues (Layman, 
Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010). 
 
Taiwan: The Rise, Fall, and Rise of the National Identity Issue  
The nature of authoritarian rule on Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War created a bitter 
legacy of ethnic hostility and tensions that reverberates in the nation’s politics even today.  Since the 
evacuation of the Chiang Kai-shek regime to Taiwan in 1949 at the end of the Chinese Civil War, the 
island has suffered from a clear ethnic cleavage between the Mainlanders who came with Chiang (a little 
under 15% of the population) and the long-time residents of Taiwan or Islanders who also were almost all 
ethnically Han Chinese.  The Mainlanders dominated the government and imposed a harsh and repressive 
rule termed the “White Terror” until the country’s democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
More broadly, especially after the initiation of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in 1966, the 
China-centric regime denigrated and discriminated against local culture and dialects by, for example, 
treating the Mandarin dialect as the official language of government and education, leading to ongoing 
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resentments among the Islanders (Cheng, 1994; Lee, 2005; Lynch, 2004; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; 
Mendel, 1970; Phillips, 2003; Wachman, 1994). 
Thus, the questions of ethnic justice and national identity, even if repressed by martial law, were 
clearly important to many Taiwanese.  Taiwan’s democratization, therefore, was widely expected to 
unleash Taiwanese nationalism on two interlinked but distinct issues:  1) rejection of the Mainlander-
dominated political regime and 2) growing hostility toward and the absolute rejection of China’s claim to 
sovereignty over Taiwan which was ironically at least tacitly supported by the Kuomintang’s policy of 
“Mainland Recovery” (Gold, 1986; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; Rigger, 1999b, 2001; Tu, 1998; 
Wachman, 1994).   
As the 1990s opened, both the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the ruling 
Kuomintang (KMT) seemingly placed opposing bets on how the citizens of Taiwan would respond to this 
issue.  The DPP bet that the end of authoritarian controls would permit Islander resentments to be 
expressed, winning over voters to the DPP as the champion of Taiwanese nationalism.  For example, the 
DPP added support for Taiwan Independence to its Charter in 1991.  Conversely, the KMT bet that the 
satisfaction of the general population with the prosperity created by Taiwan’s “economic miracle” would 
make them supportive of the political status quo both domestically and in cross-Strait relations with 
China (Clark, 2002). 
Political forces soon began to push both parties away from these stark alternatives.  In the KMT, 
Islander Lee Teng-hui, who as Vice-President succeeded Chiang Kai-shek’s son Chiang Ching-kuo as 
President after his death in 1988, responded to this opportunity with what appeared to be inspired 
statesmanship on the national identity question.  As Lee consolidated his power, he not so subtly pushed 
the KMT’s position on cross-Strait relations in a new direction.  Lee, in fact, managed to straddle the 
national identity issue quite astutely, implicitly portraying himself as a moderate between the pro-
Independence DPP and the pro-Unification members of the KMT and (after 1993) the New Party who 
tended to be Mainlanders.  While retaining a commitment to Unification with China in the indefinite 
future, he aggressively began to pursue the “pragmatic diplomacy” of trying to upgrade Taiwan’s 
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international status.  For example, in 1993 he co-opted a popular issue from the DPP by launching a 
campaign to join the United Nations, which the KMT had strongly opposed up to then (Cabestan, 1998; 
Chao, 2002; Lasater, 2000; Sutter and Johnson, 1994).  Furthermore, the victory of Lee’s “Mainstream” 
faction clearly promoted the “Taiwanization” of the party -- which made it hard to blame it for the 
repression of the “old” KMT.  Consistent with the view that the old Kuomintang had been rejected, he 
formally apologized in 1995 for the massacre of thousands of Taiwanese by Nationalists troops in the 
Spring of 1947, the “February 28th or 2-2-8 Incident” (Chao and Myers, 1998; Hood, 1997). 
 For its part, the DPP began to moderate its position on Taiwan Independence in the early 1990s 
after the inclusion of a pro-Independence plank in the party charter apparently cost it significantly at the 
polls in 1991.  In particular, the Chinese military threats during the 1996 presidential elections and the 
woeful showing of the pro-Independence DPP candidate evidently convinced most of its leaders that 
Taiwan Independence was simply unfeasible.  Consequently, the DPP began to downplay Independence 
without ever formally renouncing it.  For example, some (but far from all) DPP leaders began to argue 
that Taiwan already was an independent country, so there was no need for a formal declaration of 
Independence (Rigger, 2001; Wang, 2000).  Taiwan’s political dynamics in the late 1990s, therefore, 
suggested that partisan differences over national identity were narrowing and losing their intensity (Clark 
and Tan, 2012; Fell, 2005).   
However, a re-escalation soon erupted following the dramatic victory of the DPP’s Chen Shui-
bian in the 2000 presidential election, which he won with just under 40% of the vote in a three-way race 
(plus a couple of inconsequential minor candidates) with the KMT’s Lien Chan and with James Soong 
who ran as an Independent after failing to get on the KMT ticket.  Two distinct types of issues were 
involved in this polarization.  The first was an ongoing struggle over the “localization” or Bentuhua of the 
country’s politics and especially culture which was consistently pushed by the Chen administration.  The 
second involved cross-Strait relations with the People’s Republic of China and was more episodic; and 
here Chen Shui-bian’s policies were far from consistent over time.  
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Domestically, Chen displayed a strong commitment pursuing Bentuhua to create a “Taiwan-
centric paradigm” for the nation (Hsiau, 2005; Jacobs, 2005).  This, in turn, stimulated substantial 
opposition and pushback from the old guard KMT (Wang, 2005).  The administration used its executive 
power to promote what it called a “Taiwanese subjectivity” that certainly was aimed at its base 
constituency.  Wei-chin Lee (2005), for example, argues that Chen promoted a Cultural Reconstruction 
Movement that included such initiatives as changing the name of many agencies and organizations to 
stress “Taiwan,” promoting Islander dialects in language policy, revising the official policy toward the 
mass media to reverse the previous KMT domination of outlets (including the encouragement of 
underground radio stations), and changing the focus from Chinese to Taiwanese history in education 
policy.  Daniel Lynch (2004), for example, concluded that Chen and his “Green” bloc (named for the 
primary color of the DPP flag) were trying to create a new nation rooted in Taiwanese history and culture. 
Relations with China were much more volatile, despite Chen Shui-bian’s image as a zealot in 
promoting the declaration of de jure Taiwan Independence, which very probably would have resulted in 
military action by the PRC.  Chen’s pushing the envelope on the Independence issue commenced in the 
summer of 2002 when he proclaimed the theory that “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” 
existed, provoking significant unhappiness in both Beijing and Washington.  After that, he periodically 
set off contretemps with Beijing and Washington until he left office in 2008, as he challenged China’s 
“red lines” on Taiwan Independence by, for example, proposing or holding referenda on issues that might 
affect Taiwan’s international status and by advocating fundamental change to the country’s Constitution.  
Yet, there were also signs of pragmatism in Chen’s policies toward cross-Strait relations.  He was fairly 
conciliatory toward an unresponsive PRC for his first two years in office and negotiated a “Ten Point 
Consensus” with the widely perceived pro-China James Soong in early 2005.  More broadly, he followed 
a pattern of being aggressive toward China during electoral campaigns to appeal to the “deep Green” 
Taiwanese nationalists and then sounding much more conciliatory after the election was over, suggesting 
that he saw the DPP as a mass party.  Indeed, he only became stridently pro-Independence consistently in 
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2006 when burgeoning scandals deprived him of support from almost everybody except the deep Greens 
(Clark, 2006; Clark and Tan, 2012). 
For their part, the KMT and its “Blue” coalition (named for one of the colors in the KMT flag) 
returned to a much more “China-centric” stance after Lee Teng-hui left the party following its defeat in 
the 2000 presidential election.  According to the model developed by Yu-shan Wu (2011), this 
represented a direct response to their electoral situation.  During elections, Wu argues that the KMT acts 
like a catch-all party and appeals to the median voter with centrist policies.  Between elections when the 
party is out of power (as it was from 2000 to 2008 and from 2016 on), in contrast, it focuses its appeals on 
keeping the support of the pro-China “deep Blues,” while acting in a more pragmatic or “realist” manner 
when it controls the government. 
By the middle of the first decade in the 21st century, therefore, a harsh and viciously divisive 
debate over cross-Strait relations and national identity had come to dominate Taiwan’s politics.  The 
Greens argued that they must “stand up for Taiwan” and accused the Blues of selling Taiwan out to 
China.  In stark contrast, the Blues contended that the Greens were needlessly provocative and that a more 
accommodating policy could defuse the threat from China.  Taken to the extreme (which they often 
were), these positions implied that one side was the savior and the other the destroyer of Taiwan and its 
statehood.  Unfortunately, both critiques seem to have had some merit.  President Chen’s periodic appeals 
to his pro-Independence “base constituency” for primarily domestic purposes both infuriated China and at 
times strained relations with the United States, thereby threatening to undermine Taiwan’s position in the 
Taipei-Beijing-Washington “triangle.”  Conversely, the Blue attempts to “do business” with Beijing 
undermined Chen’s ability to deal with China; and there were even fairly credible rumors that Blue 
leaders had urged both the PRC and US to “get tough” with the Chen administration which in itself might 
have created a security threat to Taiwan (Clark, 2006; Hickey, 2006; Rigger, 2005). 
The election of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s President in 2008 led to a reduction of 
tensions with China.  In particular, Ma negotiated the “Three Links” of trade, transportation and mail in 
2008 and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010.  Initially, these were quite 
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controversial and stimulated massive DPP-led demonstrations, which continued the sharp polarization of 
the Chen Shui-bian era.  However, probably because no readily identifiable disastrous consequences 
occurred, the sharp polarization over them moderated by the end of Ma’s first term.  However, they 
remerged in 2014 with the emergence of the student-led Sunflower Movement which protested Ma’s 
attempt to force the highly controversial Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) through the 
Legislative Yuan.  Subsequently, the DPP won the local elections in 2014 handily and then took control 
of the government in the 2016 presidential and legislative elections, in which Tsai Ing-wen decisively 
became President with 56% of the vote and the DPP captured the Legislative Yuan for the first time ever 
(Clark and Tan, 2012; Copper, 2012, 2016). 
Tsai remained quite popular for her first year in office, as she had an approval rate of nearly 70% 
in May 2017.  However, this dropped sharply to just over 40% over the next six months and then 
plummeted again to around 20% in May of 2018 due to a combination of factors.  First, the DPP’s 
dominant political position following the 2016 elections very probably meant that it became the target of 
some of the resentment directed toward the political establishment.  Second, several of the DPP’s policies 
toward pensions and labor relations became quite controversial.  Third, while the country’s economic 
performance improved over the late Ma era, it was not perceived as especially good.  Finally, the freeze in 
relations with China that ensued after Tsai refused to endorse the “1992 Consensus” of One China with 
Separate Interpretations evidently hurt her popularity as well.  This resulted in a decisive Kuomintang 
victory in the 2018 local elections (Bush, 2018; Copper, 2019; Luo and Chen, 2018; Tsai, 2018, 2019).   
The KMT had very little time to savor its victory, however, as increasing tensions in cross-Strait 
relations led to a surge in support for Tsai Ing-wen.  Two separate factors were at work here.  First, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping made a very harsh speech demanding unification in January 2018, which 
undercut the KMT’s position on Taiwan’s relationship with China; and, second, the escalating protests in 
Hong Kong greatly increased the sense of a Chinese threat in Taiwan.  Tsai’s strong response in standing 
up for Taiwan against these threats from China proved to be quite popular (Copper, 2019; Everington, 
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2019).  Thus, the cultural issue of Taiwan’s identity and international status has evidently reemerged as 
the centerpiece of Taiwan politics. 
   
The Rise of Cultural and Identity Politics in the U.S. 
The growing importance of identity politics in the United States can be traced to a fundamental 
change in the nature of the prominent issues that divide Democrats from Republicans.  During most of the 
so-called New Deal era in U.S. politics (i.e., the 1930s through the 1960s), political life was dominated by 
economic issues concerning the role of government and the distribution of resources in American society.  
Beginning in the 1970s, however, a new issue cleavage concerning social and cultural values arose that 
has become increasingly central to partisan conflict and competition over the last three decades.  These 
new issues are much more directly caught up in the cultural identity of people and groups.  Therefore, 
their growing salience in American politics has resulted in the rise of the highly emotional symbolic 
politics associated with conflicts over basic identity questions. 
For the last several decades, political science research has found that two different major 
dimensions or types of issues exist in American politics which have been called “economic” and 
“cultural” issues (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Miller and 
Schofield, 2003; Shafer and Claggett, 1995).  The first issue dimension has its roots in the Great 
Depression and focuses upon the Politics of Rich and Poor (Phillips, 1990).  On this dimension, 
Republicans generally advocate smaller government and reduced public spending in order to free 
resources for private utilization which is justified both in terms of individual liberty and in terms of the 
efficiency of laissez-faire economics.  In contrast, Democrats advocate expanded government 
responsibility both to promote the economy and, usually more importantly, to help those on the margins 
of society.  At the time of the Great Depression and into the 1950s, these issues stimulated bitter partisan 
polarization between the advocates and opponents of Roosevelt’s New Deal, as was common during the 
era of mass parties.  Growing prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s gradually weakened their divisiveness, 
however, as both the Democrats and Republicans became catch-all parties. 
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The second set of issues is rooted in the social upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s when the 
“traditional values” of American society came under increasing challenge by insurgent political and social 
groups trumpeting a “new morality” (Frum, 2000).  Here, Democrats and Republicans actually exchange 
positions on the desirability of freedom and, at least by implication, of governmental activism.  
Republicans, fearing that America is Slouching Towards Gomorrah (Bork, 1996), stress traditional values 
and maintaining order, while Democrats are more supportive of “secularism” and “permissiveness.”  It is 
these issues, such as abortion, crime, gay marriage, the display of religious symbols, race, immigration, 
and gun control, which became the heart of America’s polarization and increasing turn toward cultural 
politics during the 1980s and 1990s.  Significant minorities take polar-opposite positions, refuse even to 
consider compromise, and are constantly on the lookout for new issues.  For example, prochoice and 
prolife groups on abortion became mobilized, respectively, for and against stem cell research (Hunter, 
1991; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002).   
This results in issues being presented as highly symbolic ones on which compromise is 
impossible because it would undermine the status and position of a particular group in American politics.  
To use the terminology of James Hunter (1991), the result has been Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define 
America.  Initially, the relationships among the supporters and opponents of these cultural issues were at 
least somewhat limited.  The intense minorities who consider their identities to be determined by their 
positions on most of these issues were fairly small for the most part; and the overlap among them was 
limited as well, leading to the image of “single-issue partisans.”  Yet, when the number of people who 
feel intensely conservative or liberal on all these issues is added up, the result is a considerable 
polarization.    
The manner in which these “culture war” issues stimulate political conflict in the United States 
differ somewhat, though, as sketched in Table 1.  Some cleavages, such as those over religion and over 
race and Civil Rights, involve the direct conflict between the status and socioeconomic position of groups 
that are defined fairly clearly, although not all members of such groups may view the issue as particularly 
important.  For example, granting Civil Rights to African Americans was seen as threatening by a 
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substantial number of whites; and America at present is clearly undergoing a major battle between the 
religious and the secular over Church-state relations.  For other social issues, in contrast, the lines of 
cleavage are more complex and informal.  The battle over gun rights involves informal self-defined 
groups.   More complexly, conflicts over patriotism and immigration involve informal and self-defined 
groups who hold conflicting visions about the essence of America, the political community that forms the 
United States, and the role that the U.S. should play in world affairs.  Similarly, the battles over gay rights 
and gay marriage do not involve gays’ seeking to gain socioeconomic positions currently held by 
heterosexuals; rather supporters of traditional values believe that gay rights will undermine the existing 
social structure.  The cleavage is even more indirect on crime, where the conflict is not between law-
abiding citizens and criminals but between conservatives and liberals over how best to fight crime 
(punishing criminals vs. ameliorating bad social conditions).  Finally, the political debate over gender and 
feminism is especially complex because it involves both a direct competition between women and men 
and a challenge to the society opposed by supporters of traditional values among both sexes (Brewer and 
Stonecash, 2006; Hunter, 1991; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002). 
Table 1 about here 
The different dynamics of the cultural issues summarized in Table 1 and the image of “single-
issue partisans” might suggest a limited polarization in the United States.  However, two changes over the 
several two decades have clearly exacerbated polarization.  First, economic issues noticeably increased in 
saliency and divisiveness (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and 
Cooperman, 2010).  Partisan clashes over economic issues and the role of government then escalated with 
the onset of the Great Recession, leading Arthur Brooks (2010) to proclaim the eruption of a culture war 
over How the Fight between Free Enterprise and Big Government Will Shape America's Future.  Second 
and more broadly, Geoffrey Layman and his associates conclude that the two major American parties 
have become polarized on an increasingly large number of issues over in a process that they term 
“conflict extension” as conservative and liberal activists on different issues align with each other, thereby 
reducing the phenomenon of “single-issue partisans” (Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 
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2010).  This implies that the polarization between the Democratic and Republican parties has become 
fairly well institutionalized because it rests on a broad multiple-issue foundation.  Finally, Donald 
Trump’s upset victory in the 2016 presidential was based on a strong emphasis on cultural issues, leading 
John Sides and his associates to describe the campaign as an Identity Crisis: The Battle for the Meaning 
of America (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, 2018). 
 
The Disconnect between Party Polarization 
and the Distribution of Public Opinion 
 
Based on the seminal work of Anthony Downs’ (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, 
many scholars assume that the activity and nature of political parties in democratic nations are strongly 
condition by the distribution of public opinion.  Public opinion on a specific issue can have numerous 
possible distributions.  Two are particularly relevant for our analysis here.  Popular attitudes on many 
issues have a distribution that is close to what is called “normal.”  Most of the citizens are concentrated in 
the middle of the distribution; there are a clearly declining number of cases as one move from the middle 
toward either extreme; and the distribution is symmetric in that equal numbers are associated with the two 
extremes of the distribution, creating a “bell curve.”  In stark contrast, a “polarized” distribution has a 
substantial number of cases at both the extremes, while there are relatively few in the middle, creating a 
“U-shaped curve” if the number of cases are plotted.  A polarized distribution is also “bimodal” in the 
sense that there are two modes (i.e., the categories with the largest number of cases in them), one at each 
of the ideological extremes. 
Overall, as summarized in Table 2, political attitudes in combination might form one of five 
different types of distributions, assuming a polity with two major parties.  The first two are easy to 
understand.  If most citizens favored the positions of a specific party (the DPP or KMT in Taiwan or 
Democrats or Republicans in the United States), then we would have a partisan public dominated by that 
party (A or B).  Third, there would be a polarized public if a fairly even balance exists between the strong 
supporters of Party A and B on most issues.  A fourth possibility is that the general citizenry is not happy 
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with either extreme and, rather, takes a position in the middle of the ideological spectrum on most issues.  
In this case, we would say that the nature of public opinion indicates a moderate public.  The final 
possibility is that the public favors Party A on a considerable number of issues, but also supports Party B 
on many others.  Here, there would be a split public. 
Table 2 about here 
The strong elite partisan polarization in both Taiwan and the U.S. implies that we should expect 
polarized distributions of public opinion in both countries.  This section, therefore, examines data on how 
citizens line up on the major issues in the two countries.  The evidence from Taiwan is clear-cut.  On the 
two central issues of national identity and cross-Strait relations, the distribution of public opinion is far 
from polarized.  For America, the nature of public opinion is more complex.  On some issues, Americans 
are conservative and pro-Republican; on others they are liberal and pro-Democrat; and on a few they are 
either moderate or polarized.  What is strongly evident, though, is that public opinion in the United States 
does not follow a pattern of strong and consistent polarization in the public across a broad array of issues.  
Rather it is clearly split.  Consequently, citizen political views are not the primary driving force behind 
party polarization in either the United States or Taiwan.    
 
Non-polarized Public Opinion on National Identity and Cross-Strait Relations in Taiwan 
 
The polarization over national identity and cross-Strait relations in the elite discourse and party 
competition in Taiwan would strongly suggest that such polarization exists among the general electorate 
as well for either of two reasons.  The elites might have responded to a sharp polarization in public 
opinion; or the citizenry may have become more polarized once the elite debate brought the issue to the 
center of Taiwan’s politics.  If neither of these conditions existed and a majority of Taiwanese was in the 
“moderate middle,” the major parties would have a strong incentive to moderate their policies or risk 
punishment at the polls (Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976). 
A variety of public opinion data cast considerable doubt upon the image of a polarized electorate.  
In particular, many of Taiwan’s citizens possess a complex identity that includes both Taiwanese and 
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Chinese components and are wary about extreme positions on cross-Strait relations (Brown, 2004; 
Rigger, 1999a; Wachman, 1994).  For the last quarter century, public opinion surveys have asked whether 
people identify themselves as Chinese, Taiwanese, or a combination of both.  Table 3 shows that national 
identity clearly possessed a normal distribution in 1992 as just over half the population (52%) expressed a 
dual identity, while Chinese identifiers slightly outnumbered Taiwanese ones (28% to 20%).  This 
changed dramatically in just eight years.  In 2000, about half the population (47%) still had dual 
identification, but Taiwanese identifiers outnumbered Chinese ones 39% to 14%.  The Chen Shui-bian 
years continued this trend as Taiwanese identification grew from 39% to 51% between 2000 and 2005, 
while Chinese identification collapsed further to just 4%.  Finally, Taiwanese identifiers continued to 
increase to 55% of the population in 2010 and 66% in 2016. 
Table 3 about here 
These data certainly show that the “China-centered paradigm” is a thing of the past in Taiwan, as 
by 2010 or even 2000 the number of purely Chinese identifiers in Taiwan had become minuscule.  Wang 
and Chang (2005) show that this trend was even pronounced among Mainlanders, as evidenced by the 
data in Table 4.  Chinese identifiers among Mainlanders fell by almost a half from 57% to 29% between 
just 1994 and 2000 and then fell by nearly a half again to 16% in 2004 and 12%.  Even before the sharp 
polarization of the 2000s, therefore, the “deep Blues” were a decided minority of a small minority of the 
population; and the decline in Chinese identification among Mainlanders continued apace during the first 
Chen administration despite his escalating appeals to Taiwanese nationalism.  Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese 
Cultural Renaissance Movement was surely dead and buried.   
Table 4 about here 
Evaluating the degree of polarization versus moderation concerning the “Taiwan-centric 
paradigm” is a little more problematic and ambiguous, however.  By 2000, the distribution of opinion on 
national identity was no longer normal, as Taiwanese identifiers greatly outnumbered Chinese ones.  Over 
the next ten years, furthermore, the number of Taiwanese identifiers grew substantially, surpassed those 
who thought of themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese in 2008, and attained a marked lead over dual 
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identifiers of 55% to 42% in 2010; and by 2016 the gap had widened to 66% to 31% .  These data, 
however, support two quite different interpretations.   
On the one hand, there clearly was a massive shift toward Taiwanese identification (Ho and Liu, 
2003; Shen and Wu, 2008) which is consistent with the argument that Chen Shui-bian was able to create a 
new nation rooted in Taiwanese history and culture (Lynch, 2004).  This was expressed during the 2004 
campaign not just by the supporters of Chen.  Rather, it could also be seen in the actions and words of the 
Pan-Blue leadership.  For example, during their final massive campaign rallies the KMT presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates Lien Chan and James Soong kissed the ground in Taipei and Taichung 
respectively to demonstrate their devotion and loyalty to Taiwan (Huang, 2004); and Lien Chan was 
quoted as saying, “There is one state on each side of the Taiwan Strait,” thereby echoing what was seen as 
a provocative argument by Chen Shui-bian in 2002 (Rawnsley, 2004). 
On the other hand, the strong minority who professes a dual identity is inconsistent with the 
image of the new totally Taiwanese nation that was supposedly created by what Wei-chin Lee (2005) 
termed Chen’s “Cultural Reconstruction Movement.”  This can also be seen in how the public views the 
best option for Taiwan’s international status:  1) Taiwan Independence, 2) the current status quo of an 
uncertain sovereignty, or 3) Unification with the PRC.  Table 5 demonstrates since the early 1990s 
marked majorities of about 60% have supported the diplomatic status quo, ambiguous and even ridiculous 
as it may be.  This distribution is not fully normal, though, because the two extremes are not balanced.  In 
particular, between 1994 and 2016 the relative support for Independence and Unification flip-flopped 
from 14% - 25% to 32% - 12%.  Still, since the Taiwan-centric paradigm advocates Independence, 
popular opinion does indeed appear to be dominated by the moderate middle.  
Table 5 about here 
This strong and continuing support for the status quo in Taiwan’s international status is especially 
striking because, as Rigger (2004) has noted, growing frustration across the political spectrum with 
Taiwan’s lack of international status and treatment by the PRC is very easy to discern.  Rather, the 
dangers of the two extreme are so pronounced that the not-particularly-satisfactory current situation is 
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accepted as tolerable.  In short, the “moderate middle” in Taiwan almost certainly does not have any 
hesitation in affirming “Taiwan, Yes!” -- a slogan in Chen Shui-bian’s 2004 presidential campaign (de 
Lisle, 2004).  However, its Taiwan-centric allegiances fall considerably short of what the Deep Greens 
consider to be necessary for a Taiwan nation.  For example, Shelley Rigger’s (2011) interviews of young 
people found that even the term “Love Taiwan” was viewed with suspicion because it had become so 
politicized.  Thus, Chen’s Cultural Reconstruction Movement may have over-reached, just as Chiang Kai-
shek’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement did. 
The data on Taiwanese party identification in June 2018 are also inconsistent with the image of a 
polarized public.  Neither of the major parties are very popular, as both receive the support of less than a 
quarter (23%) of the citizenry; and a third (32%) of the public is nonpartisan.  For the two minor parties in 
the Legislative Yuan, the New Power Party gets 8%, while the PFP receives the support of only 2% of 
Taiwanese (Chen, 2018; You, 2018).  Consequently, there is little sign of a KMT resurgence, but the DPP 
does not appear to have become a dominant party either. 
Table 6 here 
  
A Split Public in the United States 
 As noted in the previous section, there is a basic distinction between economic and cultural 
issues in American politics, while especially since the September 11th terror attack, security issues 
represent a third dimension in U.S. public opinion (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Leege, Wald, Krueger, 
and Mueller, 2002; Miller and Schofield, 2003; Shafer and Claggett, 1995).  In this section, we examine 
public opinion in the United States at the time of the 2016 elections.  The data come from the 2016 
American National Election Study that is distributed by the International Consortium for Political and 
Social Research (2017).  We use the version of this study developed by Charles Prysby and Carmine 
Scavo (2018).  Most of these positions are determined by the normal stances of conservatives and liberals.  
In two cases, however, this division is ambiguous, and we used the actual correlation of the item with 
conservative ideology.  In these instances, conservatives are more likely than liberals to feel that imports 
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should be limited to create more jobs and that terrorism is a major threat.  An ideological advantage is 
cited when there is a difference of 10 percentage points or more between the conservative and liberal 
positions.  Unfortunately, attitudes about two important Trump policies, a major tax cut and a large 
infrastructure program, are not included in the Prysby and Scavo (2018) data set.   
Table 7 presents the balance between those who favor and oppose specific economic issues.  The 
number of people who want to increase and decrease government spending and services is almost equal 
(38% to 37%), but huge majorities take the liberal position of advocating increased spending for Social 
Security (63% to 6%), public schools (70% to 7%), child care (50% to 13%), and, to a somewhat lesser 
extent, aid to the poor (45% to 17%).  Indeed, the public supports spending cuts on only one liberal item 
included in the table, welfare spending, by a conservative plurality of 46% to 20%.  Health care draws 
somewhat divided opinions.  While a liberal plurality of 47% to 26% wants the government to increase its 
financial assistance for healthcare, the public is almost evenly split on whether to prefer a public to a 
private health plan (39% to 41%) and whether to approve or disapprove Obamacare (38% to 41%).  
Turning to other economic issues, a liberal plurality of 47% to 30% wants government to act to reduce 
income inequality by such popular liberal measures as increasing the minimum wage (65% to 30%) and 
imposing more taxes on millionaires (67% to 15%).  Americans are also quite liberal on government 
regulation, supporting significant regulation on business (78% to 22%), banks (87% to 13%), and the 
environment (58% to 23%).  They also favor the conservative position of limiting exports by a large 
majority of 62% to 38%). 
Table 7 about here 
In the realm of cultural issues, Americans take a wide variety of positions, as demonstrated by the 
data in Table 8.  They are clearly conservative on the moral traditionalism scale as 46% are rated as 
highly traditional versus 29% who have a low score on the issue.  Yet, this does not mean that the public 
is uniformly conservative in this realm.  For example, they are fairly evenly divided on the key issue of 
abortion, as they have been since the 1980s, as 40% are pro-life and 45% pro-choice.  Gay marriage, in 
contrast, is supported by a large liberal majority of 59% to 18%.  Americans are split ideologically on 
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immigration as well.  They are strongly conservative on the level of immigration, as only 6% want to 
increase it while 44% want to decrease it.  In contrast, a huge liberal majority of 69% to 17% wants illegal 
immigrants to be able to stay in the U.S. as opposed to being deported; and a narrow liberal plurality 
(41% to 31%) opposes eliminating birthright citizenship.  In terms of race and gender issues, the public is 
moderately conservative, as it ranks high rather than low on the sexism scale (50% score high and 35% 
low) and low rather than high on the African-American support scale (35% to 45%).  Finally, opinion 
about making gun purchases more difficult is fairly even as 54% support and 46% oppose this policy, 
while a liberal plurality of 45% to 29% supports the legalization of marijuana. 
Table 8 here 
The security issues included in Table 9 include both international and domestic components.  
Americans are quite conservative on the three international issues included in our analysis.  They support 
increased defense spending (50% to 23%), are willing to use military force (66% to 30%), and have a 
high fear of terrorism (46% to 25%).  They are also quite conservative on law and order issues.  In 
addition to their overwhelming support for increased crime spending (64% to 8%), they also favor the 
death penalty by the extremely strong margin of 75% to 17%.  The only liberal position on a security 
issue in Table 9 is the plurality of 46% to 33% which opposes the border wall that Trump proposed.  
Furthermore, Americans are not necessarily knee-jerk conservatives in the realm of international security.  
In 2008, as shown by Table 10, they overwhelmingly supported the War on Terror by a 60% to 25% 
margin.  In contrast, though, they disapproved of the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by similar huge 
majorities of 58% to 23% and 63% to 25% respectively (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Leege, Wald, 
Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Miller and Schofield, 2003; Shafer and Claggett, 1995).   
Table 9 and 10 here 
Table 11 indicates the distribution of party identification in the United States at the time of the 
2016 election differed considerably from the one for 2018 Taiwan.  First and most dramatically, only 
13.8% of the respondents indicate that they do not have any allegiance to one of the two major parties.  
Second, the table also allows us to gauge how enthusiastic the followers of the two parties are.  For 
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example, 21.4% of the population consider themselves strong Democrats, while 25.2% are only weak or 
leaning Democrats.   Thus, there is a tendency for Democrats to be clustered at the strong end of the scale; 
and the same tendency, although less pronounced, exists for Republicans.  In all, 63.4% of Americans fall 
into the four extreme categories, while only 36.5% are in the middle three, indicating a significant 
polarization of party allegiances.   
The nature of public opinion in the United States, therefore, is quite complex.  It definitely is 
neither moderate nor polarized.  Rather, American attitudes are a clearly split mix of conservative and 
liberal positions, as there is an ideological difference of less than 10 percentage points on only 6 of the 35 
issues included in Tables 7 through 10.  Clearly, the public in the United States is ideologically split or, 
some would say, schizophrenic.   Unlike the moderate and polarized publics, a split public does not 
provide a clear incentive system for politicians attempting to maximize their electoral support by 
appealing to either the moderate median voter or to their ideological base constituencies.  It does imply, 
however, that a mixed ideological message appealing to the different desires of the citizenry should be the 
most efficacious.  Consequently, the current ideologically monolithic positions of the Democrats and 
Republicans (Black and Black, 2007; Brownstein, 2007) appear to be a little puzzling.  
 
A Growing Challenge to Catch-all Parties?     
 
Downsian theory is based upon two eminently reasonable assumptions.  First, politicians want to 
win office both for the sake of their own careers and to implement their desired policies.  Second, they 
therefore respond to the distribution of public opinion in a polity by tailoring their appeals to maximize 
their electoral support.  From this perspective, the disconnent between public opinion and strong elite 
party polarization in both Taiwan and the United States creates a theoretical puzzle.  Norman Schofield 
and Gary Miller (2007) present an answer to this seeming paradox with their argument that political 
leaders must motivate the support of activists who are much more ideological than the general public and 
balance groups with significantly different political values (e.g., the support of economic and social 
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conservatives for the Republican party in the U.S.).  Moreover, one would presume that many politicians 
have fairly strong policy preferences as well. 
The Schofield-Miller model provides a welcome stride beyond conventional Downsian analysis.  
It still leaves one question begging, however.  Why do not voters punish a party that moves too far away 
from their preferences or support a new party if none of the existing ones appeal to them?  This is 
especially puzzling if we assume the prevalence of catch-all parties which are not very distinct 
ideologically and moderate voters (consumers) who flit between them at polls, similarly to their decision 
to go to McDonalds or Burger King on a particular evening.   
Growing party polarization, therefore, raises the question of whether the era of catch-all parties is 
passing.  This could be occurring for several reasons.  First, new cultural issues could have created 
staunch constituencies, such as economic cleavages did during the era of mass parties.  Second, the 
“stickiness” of political institutions (March and Olsen, 1989) might account for the “freezing” of party 
systems over the last 80 years (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997), making the advent of new parties 
difficult and giving the existing major parties significant leeway to move away from the median voter.  
Third, most voters could develop strong enough attachments to a party or strong enough aversions to its 
rivals to make the risk of defection fairly small. 
Taiwan and the U.S. provide good case studies of this challenge to catch-all parties.  Both have 
two-party systems that appear fairly stable (Abramowitz, 2010, 2011; Clark and Tan, 2012), although 
there are some indications over the last half decade that the nature of the party system may be starting to 
shift in Taiwan (Clark, Tan, and Ho, 2019).  Thus, party leaders have the leeway and perhaps the 
incentive to transfer their parties back from catch-all to mass parties.  Such a process can be seen in both 
Taiwan and America, although it is by no means completed in either country. 
There also is good reason to view cultural issues as important in both nations, albeit in somewhat 
different forms.  The national identity question is certainly a cultural issue that has been quite important, 
if not central, in recent Taiwanese politics; and it is rooted in a major ethnic division (Clark and Tan, 
2012; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; Wachman, 1994).    In contrast to Taiwan, which has just one central 
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cultural issue, there are an expanding number of cultural conflicts in America on which the Democrats 
and Republicans have become similarly polarized (Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Hunter, 1991; Layman, 
Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010 Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002; Sides, Tesler, 
and Vavreck, 2018).  While there is no single defining social division, such as class or ethnicity, 
Americans’ positions on cultural issues are related to specific social groups based on religiosity, region 
and race (Abramowitz, 2010, 2011; Black and Black, 2007; Brewer and Stonecash, 2006; Stonecash, 
Brewer, and Mariani, 2003).   
There is certainly the potential, therefore, for party leaders in both states to follow the “mass” 
strategy of appealing to the strong attitudes of fairly well defined social groups.  The United States seems 
well on its way to a transformation from catch-all to mass parties.  The Democrats and Republicans are 
increasingly polarized on a broad array of cultural issues in a process driven by highly ideological party 
activists; and, if anything, this polarization and focusing of campaign appeals upon “base constituencies” 
is intensifying with the presidency of Donald Trump and the “Resistance” to it (Bacon, 2019; Enten, 
2019; Kunkle and Natason, 2019; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, 2018).  The situation is somewhat more 
ambiguous and problematic in Taiwan.  Especially during the Chen Shui-bian era, both the DPP and 
KMT acted as mass parties by focusing their appeals about national identity upon their base 
constituencies much of the time.  Yet, as discussed in the second section, these initiatives (even those by 
the supposed Independence zealot Chen) appeared strategic in the sense that appeals to Chinese and 
Taiwanese nationalism were turned on and off depending upon the political situation (Clark and Tan, 
2012; Wu, 2011).  This pattern continued after Ma Ying-jeou was elected President (Clark, 2011; Copper, 
2011; Fell, 2011; Gold, 2010; Rigger, 2010; Tien and Tung, 2011); and Taiwan politics during the Tsai 
era have followed a rollercoaster of changing party fortunes, leaving the nature of Taiwan’s party system 
still to be determined.  
A broader theoretical explanation for this may lie in the conclusion of Katz and Mair (1995) that 
many party systems are increasingly becoming cartels.  While both mass and catch-all parties serve as 
links between civil society and the state, this role is substantially different in a cartel party system.  In the 
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cartel party stage, parties act as brokers between the state and civil society but at the same time ensure 
their own survival by enhancing their “capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives” 
(Katz and Mair, 1995: 16).  In the case of the US and Taiwan, this is evidenced by how the dominant 
parties in these countries “stack the odds” against other challenger parties in both their election systems 
and legislative operations (Clark and Tan, 2012).  This strongly implies that the stickiness of political 
institutions and the freezing of party alternatives prevent newly mobilized parties from making effective 
challenges to the existing major parties.   
A cartel party system, though, does not mean that electoral competition necessarily ends.  If the 
major parties retain catch-all characteristics, they may use “competing claims to efficient management” to 
appeal to the voter (Katz and Mair 1995: 19) which is consistent with the normal Downsian logic.  Yet, 
while a cartel party system as envisaged by Katz and Mair (1995) involves collusion between the 
dominant parties to ensure their own organizational survival and self-interest, this does not necessarily 
mandate a particular form of party organization.  In other words, the existence of cartel party system does 
not exclude the possibility that political parties are organized like the mass parties of the past where inter-
party competition is on the basis of representative capacity by segmenting the “electorate in a series of 
exclusive constituencies” (Katz and Mair 1995: 19).  A primary implication of the parallel existence of 
mass party organization within a cartel party system is that party competition is undertaken through 
mobilization of activists by emphasizing “polarized” positions.  Voters, on the hand, are left without other 
alternatives as members of the cartel party system effectively choke off the ability of challenger parties to 
survive.  Following on this logic, then, mass parties in a cartel system have more ability to move away 
from median voter preferences without costly repercussions because voters do not have any other realistic 
voting choices and are, therefore, unable to punish them.  Unfortunately, this seems to be increasingly the 




     Table 1 
DIFFERING DYNAMICS OF CULTURAL ISSUES IN THE U.S. 
 
ISSUE          FORM OF CONFLICT          GROUPS INVOLVED 
 
RELIGION    Direct Conflict between     Religious versus   
            Clearly Defined Groups      Secular 
 
RACE &      Direct Conflict between     African Americans   
CIVIL       Clearly Defined Groups      versus whites 
RIGHTS 
 
GUN RIGHTS  Conflict between more       Those who see guns as  
            Informal & Self-defined     individual right vs  
            Groups                      those who fear them 
 
PATRIOTISM  Conflict between more       Groups with Conflicting 
            Informal & Self-defined     Views about what the   
            Groups                      U.S. Is and Should Do 
 
IMMIGRATION Conflict between more       Groups with Conflicting 
            Informal & Self-defined     Views about what the   
            Groups                      U.S. Is and Should Do 
 
GAY RIGHTS  Conflict More Indirect:     Gays versus Believers  
            Gays seen as Challenging    in Traditional Values 
            Traditional Values rather 
            Than Socioeconomic  
            Position of Other Groups 
 
CRIME       Conflict More Indirect      Conservatives versus 
                                        Liberals on Crime Policy 
 
GENDER &    1. Direct Conflict          Growing Women’s Equality 
FEMINISM       between Clearly          Hurts some Men 
               Defined Groups 
            2. Conflict More Indirect:  Feminists & Professional  
               Feminism seen as         Women vs Believers in 
               Challenging              Traditional Values 
               Traditional Values       (Religious Males & 







 POSSIBLE STRUCTURES OF PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 
TYPE                      DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC 
 
Partisan, #A        Most people favor Party A on most issues. 
 
Partisan, #B        Most people favor Party B on most issues. 
 
Polarized           A fairly even balance exists between strong 
                         supporters of Party A and Party B on 
                         most issues. 
 
Moderate            Most people are in the middle of the 
                         ideological spectrum on most issues. 
 
Split            A substantial number of Party A’s 
positions are supported by a strong 
              majority, but so are a substantial 




 ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF TAIWAN’S CITIZENS 
 
 
     Taiwanese   Both     Chinese 
 
1992   20%   52%   28% 
1996   24%   56%   20% 
2000   39%   47%   14% 
2004   43%   51%    6% 
2008   51%   45%    4% 
2010   55%   42%    3% 
2016   66%   31%    3% 
 
Source:  











 ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF MAINLANDERS 
 
     Taiwanese   Both     Chinese 
 
1994    5%   38%   57% 
1996    8%   49%   43% 
2000   11%   60%   29% 
2004   15%   69%   16% 
2016   30%   54%   16% 
 




 PREFERENCE FOR TAIWAN’S INTERNATIONAL STATUS 
 
   Independence    Status Quo    Unification 
 
1994   14%   61%   25% 
1996   17%   56%   27% 
2000   18%   59%   23% 
2004   24%   61%   15% 
2008   26%   63%   11% 
2010   24%   64%   12% 
2016*   32%    56%   12% 
 
Source: Election Study Center, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 






Taiwanese Party Identification, June 2018 
 
DPP   23%   
KMT   23%   
NPP     8%   
PFP     4% 
Nonpartisan 32% 
 
Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation Poll 
 




Table 7   
 
Americans’ Positions On Economic Issues 
 
POLITICAL ATTITUDE FAVOR IDEOLOGY 
ADVANTAGE 
More Govt Spending & Services 38% to 37%  Even 
More Social Security Spending 63% to 6%  Liberal 
More Public School Spending 70% to 7%  Liberal 
More Child Care Spending 50% to 13% Liberal 
More Poor Spending 45% to 17%  Liberal 
More Welfare Spending 20% to 46%  Conservative 
Minimum Wage Increase 65% to 35% Liberal 
Tax on Millionaires 67% to 15%  Liberal 
Govt Reduce Income Inequality 47% to 30%  Liberal 
More Government Financial 
Assistance for Healthcare 
47% to 26% Liberal 
Government Health Plan 39% to 41%  Even 
Obamacare 38% to 41% Even 
Business Regulation 78% to 22% Liberal 
Bank Regulation 87% to 13%  Liberal 
Govt Environmental Regulation 58% to 23%  Liberal 
Limit Imports 62% to 38% Conservative 
 
*Most of these items include neutral categories which are not 
included in these comparisons.  
 
SOURCE: 
Calculated from Prysby and Scavo. 2018. 
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Table 8  
 
Americans’ Positions On Cultural Issues 
 
POLITICAL ATTITUDE FAVOR IDEOLOGY 
ADVANTAGE 
High on Moral Traditionalism 46% to 29% Conservative 
Pro-Life on Abortion 40% to 45%  Even 
Gay Marriage 59% to 18% Liberal 
Raise Immigration Level 6% to 44%  Conservative 
Illegal Immigrants: Deport/Remain 17% to 69% Liberal 
Eliminate Birthright Citizenship 31% to 41% Liberal 
African-American Support Score 35% to 45% Conservative 
Sexism Scale 50% to 35% Conservative 
Make Guns Purchases More Difficult 54% to 46% Even 
Legalize Marijuana 45% to 29% Liberal 
 
*Most of these items include neutral categories which are not 
included in these comparisons.  
 
SOURCE: 
Calculated from Prysby and Scavo. 2018. 
 
 
Table 9   
 
Americans’ Positions On Security Issues 
 
More Defense Spending 50% to 23% Conservative 
Willing to Use Military Force 66% to 30% Conservative 
High Fear of Terrorism 46% to 25% Conservative 
Crime Spending 64% to 8%  Conservative 
Death Penalty 75% to 17% Conservative 
Border Wall 33% to 46%  Liberal 
*Most of these items include neutral categories which are not 
included in these comparisons.  
 
SOURCE: 












 Support for Wars, 2008 
  
                             APPROVE         DISAPPROVE 
                           
War on Terror                  60%              25%  
Iraq War              25%      63% 




Calculated from Prysby and Scavo, 2009. 
 
Table 11   
 




Strong Democrat  21.4% 
Weak Democrat  14.0% 
Leans Democrat  11.2% 
Independent  13.8% 
Leans Republican  11.5% 
Weak Republican               12.0%  
Strong Republican  16.0%  
TOTAL       99.9% 
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